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Katrina & Political Malfeasance: A Collaboration

Revision History - v1, v2, v3, v4, v5

Published by soc, September 14, 2005, 6:26 am GMT
Participation: default  
Type: Deductive  
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Critiques


1) PREMISE:   
[Author's note: This topic is meant to be collaborative so please suggest documented instances of malfeasance as critiques and together we can document the political disaster surrounding the natural one called Katrina. This will be non-partisan so no conspiracy theories please. I will update the topic frequently to include your input.]


According to the head of Homeland Security:
"That 'perfect storm' of a combination of catastrophes exceeded the foresight of the planners, and maybe anybody's foresight," Chertoff said.

He called the disaster "breathtaking in its surprise."

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2) PREMISE:   
The dire warnings about a category 4 or 5 storm hitting New Orleans were many - and - varied.

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3) PREMISE:   
FEMA director Michael Brown claimed that he believed this would be a "standard hurricane."

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4) PREMISE:   
Brown and Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, were warned of the extreme dangers of Katrina before the storm hit.

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5) PREMISE:   
In a memo dated the day the Katrina struck:
Federal Emergency Management Agency boss Michael Brown declared that rescue workers should make sure to "convey a positive image of disaster operations," according to an internal FEMA document.

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6) FROM 1,2,3,4 AND 5 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Chertoff and Brown are ineptly trying to shield their culpability in the mistakes made in the federal response.

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7) PREMISE:   
Brown claimed on September 1st, the 3rd day after the hurricane struck, that he was unaware of the thousands of people gathered at the Superdome even though images were broadcast all over the news. He said:
"That shows how difficult communications are," he told CNN news anchor Paula Zahn.

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8) PREMISE:   
Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, blamed the flood victims for not evacuating even though many had no way to leave.

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9) FROM 6,7 AND 8 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Homeland Security head Chertoff and FEMA head Brown are trying to deflect attention or they are grossly incompetent.

[note: On September 12 (day 14), Michael Brown resigned.]

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10) FROM 9 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
The President is ultimately responsible for the actions of those in his administration.

[note: On September 13th (day 15) Bush took responsibility for the federal response.]

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11) PREMISE:   
Local police forces closed off escape routes for those trying to leave New Orleans:
"We shut down the bridge," Arthur Lawson, chief of the City of Gretna Police Department, confirmed to United Press International, adding that his jurisdiction had been "a closed and secure location" since before the storm hit.
"All our people had evacuated and we locked the city down," he said.
The bridge in question -- the Crescent City Connection -- is the major artery heading west out of New Orleans across the Mississippi River. Lawson said that once the storm itself had passed Monday, police from Gretna City, Jefferson Parrish and the Louisiana State Crescent City Connection Police Department closed to foot traffic the three access points to the bridge closest to the West Bank of the river.
--
"If we had opened the bridge, our city would have looked like New Orleans does now: looted, burned and pillaged." But -- in an example of the chaos that continued to beset survivors of the storm long after it had passed -- even as Lawson's men were closing the bridge, authorities in New Orleans were telling people that it was only way out of the city.



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12) PREMISE:   
The first responders are the local police, fire and emergency services and the state police and National Guard.

The federal response comes later:
After Hurricane Pam [a simulation], FEMA officials had concluded that local authorities might be on their own for 48 or even 60 hours after a real storm, but they had assured Maestri that the cavalry would swoop in after that, and take care of the region's needs.

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13) PREMISE:   
In the US, evacuation plans and implementation including assisting those without means of transportation are the responsibility of local officials. (The country is simply too large and diverse for this to be a federal responsibility.)

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14) PREMISE:   
In a tearful appearance on Meet the Press, Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard was asked:
Shouldn't the mayor of New Orleans and the governor of New Orleans bear some responsibility? Couldn't they have been much more forceful, much more effective and much more organized in evacuating the area?
His response was that he was told that "The cavalry's coming."

--

As an aside, before the storm hit Broussard was more cavalier in his comments as he said:
Some who have ridden out previous storms in the New Orleans area may not be so lucky this time.

"I'm expecting that some people who are die-hards will die hard," he said.

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15) PREMISE:   
Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard had authority over his local police, fire and emergency services and he failed to evacuate residents of his parish even though Jefferson Parish was warned 3 days in advance.

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16) FROM 12,13,14 AND 15 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Broussard was trying to deflect responsibility from himself to the federal government.

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17) PREMISE:   
Mayor Nagin made no arrangments for food, water, security and other needs for persons at the Superdome.

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18) PREMISE:   
Mayor Nagin told those who were staying to go to the Superdome as a refuge of last resort:
The 70,000-seat Superdome, the home of football's Saints, opened at daybreak Sunday, giving first priority to frail, elderly people on walkers, some with oxygen tanks. They were told to bring enough food, water and medicine to last up to five days.



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19) FROM 17 AND 18 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Mayor Nagin was negligent in not providing required support to his city's citizens at his own designated "refuges of last resort."

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20) PREMISE:   
The city of New Orleans had a disaster relief plan that included using city buses for evacuation.
"Once a mandatory evacuation was ordered, those buses should have been leaving those parishes with those people on them," said Chip Johnson, chief of emergency operations in Avoyelles Parish, who helped put together the plan. (source)

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21) PREMISE:   
No evacuation buses were ordered into use by Mayor Nagin in order to provide transport to those without other means out of the city even though Mayor Nagin knew the likely consequences:
"We are facing a storm that most of us have long feared," he said. "This is a once-in-a-lifetime event."

But they had no intention of following the evacuation plan:
In reality, Nagin's advisers never intended to follow that plan -- and knew many residents would stay behind. "We always knew we did not have the means to evacuate the city," said Terry Ebbert, the sharp-tongued city director of emergency management.

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22) FROM 20 AND 21 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Mayor Nagin and city officials failed to follow their own evacuation plans which resulted in the stranding of thousands of individuals in the path of the hurricane.

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23) FROM 19 AND 22 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Mayor Nagin did not evacuate his city according to the evacuation plan nor did he provide even basic support for those who had to stay behind.

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24) PREMISE:   
Some unknown city leader turned down an evacuation offer from Amtrak:
In fact, while the last regularly scheduled train out of town had left a few hours earlier, Amtrak had decided to run a "dead-head" train that evening to move equipment out of the city. It was headed for high ground in Macomb, Miss., and it had room for several hundred passengers. "We offered the city the opportunity to take evacuees out of harm's way," said Amtrak spokesman Cliff Black. "The city declined."

So the ghost train left New Orleans at 8:30 p.m., with no passengers on board.


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25) PREMISE:   
In the middle of the crisis William Jefferson, a local lawmaker, used the National Guard to visit his home and pick up belongings:
Amid the chaos and confusion that engulfed New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina struck, a local congressman used National Guard troops to check on his property and rescue his personal belongings — even while New Orleans residents were trying to get rescued from rooftops, ABC News has learned.

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26) FROM 11,16,23,24 AND 25 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
The actions of the local authorities greatly contributed to this disaster.

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27) PREMISE:   
"While there has been discussion about Washington under-funding corps requests for levee improvements, the 17th Street levee that broke had recently been upgraded with concrete walls on the top." (source)

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28) PREMISE:   
The strength of the levee system was a political decision where, "ultimately, congressional funding levels largely determine just how high the embankments will reach and what levels of risk will be accepted."

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29) PREMISE:   
New Orleans' 350 mile long levee system was only designed to protect against a category 3 storm at most and "upgrading the system would take as long as 20 to 25 years, according to Al Naomi, the Corps' senior project manager for the New Orleans District." (source)

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30) PREMISE:   
Corps funding was greatest in Louisiana but the local politicians often diverted it to questionable projects:
But over the five years of President Bush's administration, Louisiana has received far more money for Corps civil works projects than any other state, about $1.9 billion; California was a distant second with less than $1.4 billion, even though its population is more than seven times as large.

Much of that Louisiana money was spent to try to keep low-lying New Orleans dry. But hundreds of millions of dollars have gone to unrelated water projects demanded by the state's congressional delegation and approved by the Corps, often after economic analyses that turned out to be inaccurate.

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31) FROM 27,28,29 AND 30 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Political foresight on behalf of policians along with decades of work and great expense would have been required to strengthen New Orleans' levees to a level capable of withstanding a category 4 or 5 storm.

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32) PREMISE:   
According to the Red Cross, local authorities didn't want the presence of the Red Cross to encourage people to stay in the city:
The state Homeland Security Department had requested--and continues to request--that the American Red Cross not come back into New Orleans following the hurricane. Our presence would keep people from evacuating and encourage others to come into the city.
[Emphasis added]

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33) PREMISE:   
According to the Red Cross the local authorities ordered them to NOT enter the city to help those in need.

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34) FROM 32 AND 33 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Governor Blanco actively prevented the Red Cross from helping those in need in New Orleans by barring the Red Cross entry into the city in a misguided effort to get people to leave; this action resulted in great suffering.

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35) PREMISE:   
The use of federal troops for local police actions is against the law.

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36) PREMISE:   
Governor Blanco, in her August 28th letter (pdf) to the President requested $130 million dollars but failed to authorize federal troops or supplies. (This was the day before the hurricane struck and the day after the President's preemptive emergency declaration "released federal resources to help meet immediate life-saving and life-sustaining human needs.")

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37) PREMISE:   
The National Guard is under the control of each state unless the federal government is granted the authority to direct them.
But she [Governor Blanco] and other state officials balked at giving up control of the Guard as Justice Department officials said would have been required by the Insurrection Act if those combat troops were to be sent in before order was restored. (source)

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38) PREMISE:   
In our federal system the national government can only intervene in a state's disaster efforts at the request of the state as it is the local leaders who best understand the needs of their region and their own capacity to respond.

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39) FROM 35,36,37 AND 38 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Governor Blanco needed to authorize federal control of troops and she did not in her August 28th request for federal funds.

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40) PREMISE:   
On September 4th, 6 days after the hurricane struck, Mayor Nagin, Governor Blanco and President Bush met and the issue of authorizing federal troops was raised:
“When the president and the governor got here, I said, 'Mr. President, Madame Governor, you two have to get in synch. If you don't, more people are going to die.” Blanco and Bush met privately at his insistence, Nagin said, after which Bush came out and told Nagin that he had given Blanco two options, and she requested a full day to decide.
Also:
The governor also rejected a more modest proposal for a hybrid command structure in which both the Guard and active-duty troops would be under the command of an active-duty, three-star general - but only after he had been sworn into the Louisiana National Guard. (source)

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41) PREMISE:   
Governor Blanco did not request any troops until September 2nd (day 4). She did not authorize the federal government to deploy these troops as she was not clear on what types of troops (e.g. neighboring National Guard troops that can be used for law enforcement purposes vs. armed forces soldiers which can not). She acknowledged that she did not specify what sorts of soldiers. "Nobody told me that I had to request that," Ms. Blanco said.

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42) PREMISE:   
According to the Washington Post, Louisiana Governor Blanco would not cede control to federal authorities even on September 3rd (day 5):
Blanco made two moves Saturday that protected her independence from the federal government: She created a philanthropic fund for the state's victims and hired James Lee Witt, Federal Emergency Management Agency director in the Clinton administration, to advise her on the relief effort.
From the same source:
Louisiana did not reach out to a multi-state mutual aid compact for assistance until Wednesday, three state and federal officials said. As of Saturday, Blanco still had not declared a state of emergency, the senior Bush official said.

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43) FROM 39,40,41 AND 42 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
By Governor Blanco not mobilizing state troops or authorizing federal assistance in time, there were not enough troops in place to deal with either the lawlessness that plagued relief efforts or to handle the relief efforts themselves.

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44) PREMISE:   
"However, unlike her Gulf state neighbors, [Governor Blanco] neglected to tap a nationwide governor's network known as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which is designed to rush supplies to disaster areas." (source)

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45) PREMISE:   
Governor Blanco did not sign a Public Health Emergency Declaration until September 2 (day 4) (pdf) which is necessary to allow doctors certified to practice in other states the ability to help out in local disaster situations. This prevented non-Louisiana state certified doctors from helping.

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46) FROM 34,43,44 AND 45 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Governor Blanco did not provide troops and fumbled and even actively prevented aid to the citizens of her state.

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47) FROM 10,26,31 AND 46 IT FOLLOWS THAT:   
Mistakes were made at many levels of government.

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Overall Topic Rating:

As I have not agreed with any critiques:

I find this topic to be sound




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